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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: THE MYTH
AND THE REALITY
DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN*
"Conglomerate enterprise does not have a well-defined place either in
public policy or in economic theory."1
USUAL DISCLAIMER
As a member of the moderate group - one extreme group maintaining
that conglomerate mergers are inherently anticompetitive and the other
extreme group suggesting that fear of conglomerate mergers is unfounded -
which holds that generalizations about conglomerates are unwarranted and
that each case must be judged on its own merits, I wondered initially if it
would be possible for me to shed any light on the controversy.2 However, I
finally succumbed to the view that it is precisely this controversy which
virtually mandates a continued exploration and examination of the
economic consequences of the conglomerate merger. Ideally then, I suppose
this paper should discuss the fact and fiction of conglomerates. I won't try to
convince anyone that this will happen. For quite clearly intermixed into the
discussion of what I consider are the myth and the reality of conglomerates
* Professor of Economics, School of Business and Public Administration, University of
Missouri. B.S., Miami University (Oxford, Ohio), 1959; M.A., Miami University (Oxford,
Ohio), 1960; Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1964.
I am once again indebted to Richard L. Wallace for his valuable help and suggestions.
However, I assume the burden for all errors.
1Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary [hereinafter cited as Concentration
Hearings], 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 37 (1965) (remarks of Corwin D. Edwards) [here-
inafter cited as Concentration Hearings Part 1].
2 Of course, it is hard to find examples of people that hold these extreme positions
without qualification. However, on occasion John M. Blair, see note 11 infra, has come
close to espousing the first view, and George J. Stigler, see note 28 infra, the second posi-
tion. Other scholars have.been quick to point out the assumptions involved in such ex-
treme positions. See, e.g., THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (G. Stigler ed. 1968), reviewed,
Dewey, 7 J. ECON. LIT, 854 (1969):
Stigler cannot understand why anyone should become agitated by a conglomerate
merger since, in its -pure form, it does not change the concentration ratio in any
market. But it is only in the static model that size bears no relation to power over
price. In an uncertain world, where rival managers act on the basis of different
information, wealth perforce increases power to act on the basis of one's own in-
formation. To say the obvious, in an uncertain world, size per se increases alter-
natives. Monopoly power and market power are interchangeable labels only when
the discussion assumes decision-making under conditions of perfect certainty
(which, as Frank Knight used to remind us, is practically a contradiction in terms).
For some excellent reading on conglomerate mergers, which also helps to "shoot down"
extreme positions, see the entire issue of 2 ANTITRUST L. &c ECON. REV. (1968), especially
William G. Shepherd's paper Conglomerate Mergers in Perspective, and the accompanying
comments by J. Fred Weston and David D. Martin, at 15-52; ECONOMICS OF CONGLOMERATE
GROWTH (L. Garoian ed.-1969).
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are my own speculations about certain aspects of conglomerates a However,
I do promise that I shall try to make it rather obvious when I leave the hard
surface of facts to take off into the clouds on heretofore undocumented
speculations.
SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS
Before examining the empirical evidence on mergers it is worth
reviewing the three basic forms of business consolidations - vertical, hor-
izontal, and conglomerate. On this count, I make no claims of originality.
I think Ansoff made as clear a distinction as anyone when he stated:
A vertical consolidation builds the firm's capabilities either "forward"
toward its markets or "backward" toward the sources of supply. A hor-
izontal consolidation rounds out the firm's product line by increasing the
line of goods sold to its customers. A conglomerate is the complement
of the above two to the complete set; it describes "all other" mergers
and in popular parlance describes them as "unrelated." 4
For some purposes it is useful to subdivide conglomerate mergers. For
instance, after defining horizontal mergers as involving companies producing
competing products and vertical mergers as involving companies having a
buyer-seller relationship, the Staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price
Stability defined conglomerate mergers as involving companies which are
neither direct competitors nor have a buyer-seller relationship. They then
argued that these conglomerate mergers fall into three broad classes:
[G]eographic market extension conglomerates involve companies making
the same product but operating in different geographic markets, e.g. a
cement company in New York merging with a cement company in Los
Angeles; product extension conglomerates involve companies making dif-
ferent but related products, e.g. a company making household detergents
and a company making other household products sold in food stores; all
3 Perhaps I should do as I saw a recent pitchman at the Wisconsin State Fair do. He
first gave everyone a free (needless to say inexpensive) gift - a ballpoint pen. He then
argued, however, that to "accumulate you must speculate." At this point he suggested
those getting the gift should give him two dollars in return for which he promised them
"nothing." He repeated several times he was promising "nothing." However, after getting
their two dollars, he did give them another equally inexpensive item. I believe it was
several refills for their pens. Of course, after promising "nothing" his "followers" could
hardly accuse him of false advertising
4 Ansoff, Issues in National Policy on Growth of Firms, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
MERGERs 202-03 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Weston & Peltz-
man]. The Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1969, at 6, col. 2, describes how men who do
not like the word say "conglomerate" is a rock. That is, "conglomerate" is a geological
term meaning a mass of heterogeneous materials. However, it is widely used in business
parlance and some firms describe themselves as "emerging," "mature," or even "junior"
(e.g., Rajac Industry of Tucson) conglomerates. One New York company now calls itself
Conglomerates, Inc. (changed from Gold Canyon Mining Company). Executives of some
conglomerates dislike the term. For instance, George T. Scharffenberger, Jr., President of
City Investing Company, says the word reminds him of "cold congealed oatmeal." Dr. Roy
Ash, President of Litton Industries, complains that current usage of the term reminds him
of a Lewis Carroll definition: "It means what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less."
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other conglomerates are those not included among the above categories
and therefore involve unrelated products, e.g. a meat packer and a
petroleum company."
One of the basic questions to which this Symposium is directed is
whether the present antitrust statutes can be constructed to prohibit the
conglomerate merger. Clearly, under fairly well defined circumstances, anti-
trusters can and have attacked the vertical and horizontal merger forms.6
There is some indirect evidence, slender and inconclusive though it is, that
at least the investment community thinks the classic FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co. (Clorox)7 case and other things suggest that conglomerates will
start to feel the effects of more vigorous antitrust enforcement. At the .time
this was written (September, 1969), although there had been a general
downturn in the market in recent months, the giant and even the so-called
mini-conglomerates had suffered much more severe losses. Some firms were
even claiming they were not "conglomerates," but instead used entirely new
terms - such as synergy, multi-industry, or multi-market - to describe their
activities.8 Included in the conglomerate downturn were such firms as FMC,
AMK, ITT, GE, LTV, Gulf and Western, Litton, Ogden, Rexall, Textron,
Lockheed, etc. Obviously, there are always a number of factors explaining
the fall (or rise) of any group of securities. However, I do not think it is
unreasonable to speculate that fear of a more liberal interpretation of
existing antitrust laws (as well as fear of new legislation) is one of the more
important variables precipitating the fall in the price of conglomerate
securities.
THE CURRENT MERGER MOVEMENT
There is no question that the United States economy is in the midst of
an unusually large period of acquisition, consolidation, and merger. One
very careful and enlightened study of mergers contained some very strong
comments in this regard:
Mergers, more than any other single economic factor, explain the existing
structure of many American industries. Most contemporary big businesses
owe their relative size to merger-accelerated growth, and current levels of
concentration in many industries are directly linked to one or more of
the merger movements that have swept through Arnercian industry.9
5 STAFF OF CoM. ON PRICE STABILITY, CABINET STUDIES, STUDY PAPER No. 2, INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY 75-78 (Jan. 1969) [hereinafter cited as STUDY PAPER
No. 2].
6 How effective these "attacks" have been is, of course, another question too detailed
and involved to be taken up here. See, e.g., Elzinga, The Antirnerger Law: Pyrrhic Vic-
tories, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 43-78 (1969).
7 386 U.S. 568 (1967). In this case the Federal Trade Commission challenged the merger
of Procter & Gamble with Clorox Chemical under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The gov-
ernment's case to a large extent depended on the existing television rate structures. Peter-
man, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 321-422 (1968),
reviews the case and its implication in considerable detail.
8 See discussion at note 4 supra.
9 STUDY PAPER No. 2, at 69. We are indebted to this source for many of our factual
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Of course, this statement covers all the big merger movements - 1897-
1903, 1920's -and not just the third movement which started in the latter
years of World War II. This latter movement has two distinct phases: (1)
the 1943-1947 period which was directed at particular industries, e.g., dis-
tilling; and (2) the 1954-today cycle which, like the movement of the 1920's,
involves distributive as well as manufacturing finns.
Disproportionate Growth in Conglomerate Mergers
Suprisingly, the current consolidation movement has had little direct
impact on market concentration. This is because vigorous antitrust enforce-
ment has severely arrested the growth both in horizontal and vertical
mergers.
Whereas horizontal mergers comprised 41 percent of the assets of all large
mergers in 1948-51, this percentage had fallen to 2.5 percent by 1968.
Vertical mergers also have declined in relative importance, falling from
20.5 percent of the assets in 1948-51 to 6.8 percent in 1968. The great in-
crease has occurred in the "other" conglomerate category, which had
grown to 45.0 percent of the total by 1968.10
In a different study, the Federal Trade Commission found that con-
glomerate mergers accounted for 71.0 percent of the assets of all "large"
companies (i.e., with assets of over $10 million) acquired during 1960-1964.11
In short, while the Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 of the Clayton
Act1 2 (signed into law by President Truman on December 29, 1950) has been
a fairly effective restraint against horizontal and vertical mergers, there is a
"consensus that it has not been a significant deterrent to conglomerate
mergers."'1 Although the antitrust agencies have challenged over 800
comments on merger movements in this section. Perhaps the situation described in the
text is changing. After this paper was virtually completed, the Wall Street Journal con-
tained an article in which W.T. Grimm & Company, a Chicago-based merger and acqui-
sition consultant, reported that corporate merger activitity declined 15 percent in the
third quarter from a year earlier. Wall Street journal, Oct. 2, 1969, at 9, col. 3. Carl A.
Neumann, director of research for the company, suggested that this decline was probably
the first "in many years." Grimm attributed the slower merger pace to "the stock market
slump, the Federal Government's stiffer antitrust attitude and soaring interest rates,
which curbed borrowing for acquisitions." It is likely, however, that there will be a record
set for all of 1969 as the July 2, 1969 issue reported an increase of 65 percent for the first
six months of 1969 over the same period in 1968. Although about 91 percent of the cur-
rent mergers are of a conglomerate variety, the 10 largest conglomerates made only 63
acquisitions in the first 6 months of 1969 as opposed to 134 acquisitions over the same
period in 1968.
10 STUDY PAPER No. 2, at 78. "Large" in this quote refers to firms with assets of $10
million or more. In the Appendix of this paper are four tables upon which some of the
comments in this paper are based.
11 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 516 (1965) (remarks of Dr.
Willard Mueller), quoted in Blair, Conglomerate Mergers -Theory and Congressional
Intent, in Weston & Peltzman, supra note 4, at 179.
12 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
13 Blair, supra note 11, at 179. My statement that present antitrust policy has been
fairly effective is based on several different types of study. For instance, one type found
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mergers since its passage in 1950, almost none of these have been conglomer-
ate mergers. For example, over the 1950-1966 period the agencies challenged
27 percent of all horizontal mergers between "large" companies but chal-
lenged fewer than 2 percent of the conglomerate type (this figure includes
product-extension as well as "pure" conglomerate mergers, although none
of the latter were challenged). While the agencies have issued merger guide-
lines, many think much more is needed (for instance it might be better to
tell firms which mergers are permitted rather than which are forbidden).
In fact, the Staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability stated that the
"Act [Celler-Kefauver] is inadequate to cope with the massive industrial
restructuring from current conglomerate merger activity.' 4
There have been two significant effects of the current merger movement:
(1) an enlarged share of manufacturing assets held by the 200 largest corpora-
tions, and (2) a greatly reduced number of "medium sized" companies in the
economy.15 Between 1948-1967 (1960-1967) the top 200 corporations' share of
total manufacturing assets rose from 48.1 (54.2) to 58.7 (58.7) percent. Over
the same periods the number of "medium sized" firms ($25-250 million in
assets) did not grow proportionately; in fact there was no absolute growth
after 1967.
Intermixed in the overall growth in conglomerate activity is enormous
growth by particular industrial groups. For instance, it has been estimated
that almost 90 percent of the entries of the "large" food manufacturers into
new industries occurred by merger. 16
Reasons for Merger
To help understand this massive merger movement, it is useful to re-
view why firms merge. There has been a number of erroneous notions that
have grown up concerning these motives. It is also worth examining these
different motives carefully since many people are concerned that financial
the deleterious effect of monopoly on the economy in terms of resource allocation to be
quite small. The studies of Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECoN.
REV. 77-87 (1954), and Schwartzman, The Effect of Monopoly on Price, 67 J. POL, ECON.
352-62 (1959), The Effect of Monopoly: A Correction, 69 J. jOL. ECON. 494 (1961), and The
Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON. 627-30 (1960), estimated the welfare loss to be less
than 1/10 of 1 percent of the national income. Rees, The Effects of Unions on Resource
Allocation, 6 J. LAW & ECON. 69-78 (1963), found a similar order of magnitude of loss
emanating from the effect of unionization. Kamerschen, A Critique of the Status Quo
Approach, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 747-60 (1964); American Antitrust Policy: At the Halfway
House, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 879-96 (1965); and An Estimation of the 'Welfare Losses' from
Monopoly in the American Economy, 4 W. ECON. J. 221-37 (1966), placed the losses at a
somewhat higher level. D. WORCESTER, MONOPOLY, BIG BUSINESS AND WELFARE IN THE POST-
WAR UNITED STATES (1967) summarizes and extends this type of approach. I now have
serious reservations about the usefulness of this type of inquiry.
14 STUDY PAPER No. 2, at 86.
15 We have followed STUDY PAPER No. 2 in calling these firms "medium size" here
when they have assets between about $25 million and $250 million although this is incon.
sistent with the rest of this paper, as well as their study, where "large" refers to $10 million
or more in assets.
16 FTC, THE STRUCTURE OF FOOD MANUFACTURING 118 (1966).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and speculative motives, rather than economic efficiency and growth mo-
tives, are the main forces in the current merger movement. "Firms may
wish to grow for a variety of reasons: to achieve economies of large-scale
production or distribution, to attain market power, or simply to grow
larger because doing so promises to enrich management or contribute to
the overall prestige of the firm and its management."'
17
It is useful to begin by pointing out that it is possible, though rather
uncommon, for mergers to raise concentration and "competition" simultane-
ously.' 8 The acquisition and expansion of a small firm, which is inefficient
and destined to financially "die," operating in a highly concentrated industry,
could be healthy. However, the exact circumstances in which a conglomerate
merger may enhance competition may be rare. It is worth adding, however,
that vertical integration may also not be monopolistic in its results if every
stage of production is competitive. Some writers give the erroneous impres-
sion that vertical integration necessarily is associated with greater monopoly
power.
17 STUDY PAPER No. 2, at 70. A capable and comprehensive discussion of the motives
is found in Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 181-202 (remarks of Irwin Stelzer). Attorney
General Mitchell, 115 CONe. REc. 6659-61 (daily ed. June 18, 1969), among others, questions
most of these arguments. While admitting that the large corporation is needed in some
industries because of capital-investment requirements, he took exception to most of the
other arguments. For instance, he argues that giantism does "not necessarily increase
efficiency and profits, corporate bigness doesn't necessarily stimulate the most imaginative
scientific research." He claimed that recent studies show that "the medium-size firm tends
to be more productive in its research precisely because it isn't dominant." Further, he said
that the leading companies in the auto and razor blade industries -"two of our most
highly concentrated industries," offered consumers new products only "in response to ag-
gressive foreign competition."
Is Some of the comments in this section draw on Kamerschen, Recurrent Objections
to the Theory of Imperfect Competition, in ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSEN-
CHAFT 1-7 (1969). Of course the Government recognizes that mergers can improve competi-
tion. Mergers, per se, are not illegal under federal law. However, they are illegal when
their probable effect will be a substantial lessening of competition in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country. Wolf, Conglomerate Mergers and Competitive Affect,
5 TENN. SURVEY 5 (1969), on the basis of an examination of the "decided cases, complaints
filed, published statements of enforcement officials, and academic writings," suggests cases
where conglomerate mergers would probably be illegal:
(1) mergers between the top 200 manufacturing firms, or firms of equivalent size
in other sectors; (2) mergers between a member of the top 200 manufacturing
firms, or its equivalent in other sectors, and another smaller firm but one holding
a monopolistic, dominant or strongly oligopolistic position in one or more of the
markets in which it operates; and (3) mergers between two firms each of which,
while not among the top 200, does have a position of significant market power in
one or more of the lines in which it operates.
Wolf's comments follow closely the position taken by Attorney General Mitchell in his
speech reported in 115 CON. REC. 6659-61 (daily ed. June 18, 1969). Appendix Table IV is
a list of some of the companies that the Wall Street Journal thought would fall under
Mitchell's suggested guidelines, based on 1968 Fortune data on assets. This list is meant
to be suggestive and by no means definitive. Probably the economist most influential in
calling our attention ini recent years to the threat of the leading firms is Willard Mueller,
the FTC's chief economist who, e.g., in the Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1967, at 1, col. 6,
predicted that if the then present merger pace continued that the nation's 200 largest firms
likely would control two-thirds of all manufacturing assets by 1975. He went on to state
that "while this isn't necessarily bad, the bits and pieces of evidence we have suggest that
there are real reasons for concern over this."
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It is entirely possible for a merger to be profitable even if there is free
entry, provided long-run equilibrium is not reached too quickly. The early
monopoly "gains" may, in present-value terms, exceed the latter "losses"
from such policy. Similarly, it is conceivable- some might argue likely -
that it is more profitable to merely retard the rate of entry of competitors
rather than prevent it altogether.
Regarding the possibilities of merger to achieve economies of scale, a
number of students have registered extreme skepticism. 19 It is, of course,
entirely possible that the combining of two or more enterprises under one
corporate roof could result in greater economic efficiency than if the firms
continued to operate independently. But what have been the actual facts?
A recent study by Collins and Preston bears at least indirectly on this
question. After documenting that price-cost margins are correlated with firm
size, they state:
[I]n some industries the margin advantages of the largest firms may be
due to cost advantages associated with scale and/or continuity of opera-
tions. However, the failure of concentration to increase more frequently
in these industries than in industries in which the margin differences are
reversed, throws some doubt on the cost hypothesis. Rather, it may well
be that the margin advantages of the largest firms are due to less elastic
demand, resulting from prominent market positions, extensive distribu-
tion networks, long-term patronage loyalties, and other characteristics
based upon and associated with large-scale advertising. A second point
worth emphasis in this connection is that even if the largest firms do
possess cost advantages, the margin data indicate that such advantages
often lead to greater profits (i.e. margin advantages) rather than to lower
final goods prices and corresponding increases in output.20
A second bit of evidence that deals with this matter is two recent studies
relating mergers to profitability. One study found that although merging
companies grow faster than nonmerging ones, on the average they tend to be
less profitable.2 1 A second study22 examined the 500 largest manufacturing
corporations and found a negative correlation between the intensity of
merger activity and profitability. This was true for manufacturing as a whole
and for most major industrial groupings.
The evidence regarding economies of scale in distribution, especially
advertising, is also relevant. There have been several studies demonstrating a
statistically significant relationship between advertising, particularly tele-
vision advertising, and increases in industry concentration.2 In a wide
19 See, e.g., STUDY PAPER No. 2; Barron's, July 15, 1968, at 1; id. July 1, 1968, at 9;
Blair, supra note 11.
20 Collins & Preston, Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure, 51 REV. ECON. &
STATS. 285 (1969).
21 E. KELLY, THE PROFITABILITY OF GROWTH THROUGH MERGERS (1967).
22 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1913-40 (1966) (testimony of
Samuel R. Reid).
23 Some of these are cited in Blair, supra note 11, at 185 n.14. One of the best and
most recent of these studies is Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure and Performance, 49
REv. EcoN. & STATS. 423-40 (1967).
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variety of industries, concentrated television advertising led to sharp in-
creases in concentration.
From this it is often argued that conglomerates have a distinct ad-
vantage. Presumably, expanding conglomerates are able to afford the high
cost of TV advertising and thus use monopoly profits secured in one market
to enhance their market position in other markets. According to Blair,
"common observation suggests that this is exactly what has been taking place
in differentiated-product, heavily promoted consumer goods industries. In
the majority of such industries the leading firms are themselves conglomer-
ates." 2
4
It must be noted, however, that there is some conflicting evidence to the
alleged ubiquity of this phenomenon. For instance, you will recall that the
Clorox case was decided primarily on the basis of the presumed cost advan-
tages in advertising which Procter 8 Gamble enjoyed. For instance, television
advertising was said to cost 25 to 30 percent less for Procter 8C Gamble than
for smaller producers. However, Peterman, in his exhausting study of the
evidence, argues thusly:
[T]o the extent the case rests on television rate structures, it is based on
a fundamental misconception of their character (and of the markets for
time); that these rate structures are not (nor were they) discriminatory
according to the buyer's size; and that to the extent discounts are based
on cost differences, they do not seem sufficiently large to cause the FTC
concern. Once this is understood, there is little left upon which the FTC's
case might legitimately rest. If there is, it cannot be discovered by the
evidence and arguments presented. 25
In addition to the above evidence, there are two other recent studies
which show that mergers in general, 26 and bank mergers in particular,27
tend to be more to managers' interests than to the profit maximization
interests of shareholders. However, one must also be careful with studies
of this kind. The facts must be examined thoroughly. An excellent exam-
ple of a folklore which continued for a long time without anyone giving
it sufficient study is U.S. Steel's consolidation in 1901.28 One of the im-
portant motives that is often given for mergers is the greed of investment
bankers. The basic idea is for promoters to reap enormous fees by selling
the "watered" stock of the combined firm to "untutored" investors at ex-
orbitant prices. The classic example that is usually given for this is the
Morgan syndicate's write-up of the book value of the constituent firms in
2 4 Blair, supra note 11, at 185.
25 Peterman, supra note 7, at 396.
26 J. BossoMs, K. COHEN & S. REID, MERGERS FOR WHor-MANAGERS OR STOCKHOLDERS?
(Carnegie Institute of Technology, Working Paper No. 14, 1966).
27 Cohen & Reid, The Benefits and Costs of Bank Mergers, 1 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS, Dec. 1966, at 15-57.
28 Several of the ideas discussed in this section are indebted to the always stimulating
George J. Stigler. See his omnibus entitled, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (G. Stigler ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER].
MERGERS: MYTH AND REALITY
the formation of U.S. Steel from $700 million to $1.4 billion. Yet, a care-
ful examination of the facts shows that even though the Morgan syndicate
was paid $62 million in stock, the investor was better off purchasing U.S.
Steel than any other steel concern (except Bethlehem Steel) over the years
1901 to 1925. In fact, the accumulated market value of the shares of "Big
Steel" was twice that of the average of other steel companies over this pe-
riod.
Another bit of folklore worth emphasis concerns Rockefeller's Stan-
dard Oil. It is often felt that firms generally do better by engaging in
predatory pricing ("cutthroat competition") rather than by merging. Stan-
dard Oil is often given as the classic example of getting ahead by decreas-
ing prices in selected markets in order to force rivals to their knees before
selling out at bargain prices. Yet a careful study by McGee 29 has shown
that in fact Standard Oil usually bought out its competitors at attractive
prices rather than engaging in predatory pricing. Apparently, Aaron Di-
rector at the University of Chicago has been demonstrating to his students
for many years the rather simple theoretical foundations as to why it gen-
erally is true that an acquisitive policy yields a higher return than "cut-
throat competition." Lester Telser summarized the oral tradition at Chicago
regarding this point when he wrote: "Although reasonable men would not
engage in predatory pricing, the threat of such cutthroat competition sets
limits to the price of merger, and the share of monopoly return going to
the successful entrant."30
Possible Consequences of Conglomerate Mergers
J. Fred Weston summarized the consensus of the participants in a re-
cent symposium on conglomerate mergers as to a number of potential abuses
that might result from the developing conglomerate movement. 31 I think
his five undesirable effects are worth discussing, inasmuch as I for one would
take exception to some of them. They include: (I) inadequate reporting,
29 McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW & EcoN.
137 (1958).
30 Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 259-77 (1966).
31 Weston, Summary of Discussions on Conglomerate Mergers, in Weston & Peltzman,
at 219-24. Wolf, supra note 18, at 5, in a similar vein, suggests five reasons why conglom-
erate mergers of firms of the size or market position described in Wolf's statement repro-
duced at note 18 supra, might be likely competition:
First, such mergers create a community of interest among large firms leading to
less vigorous competition when the firms meet as rivals in various markets, know-
ing that aggressive moves in one market invite retaliatory measures in another.
Second, smaller firms competing with their enlarged rivals become more cautious
especially in regard to price competition, not wishing to invite disciplinary ac-
tions. Third, potential competitors shy away from otherwise attractive markets,
not willing to take on a large conglomerate. Fourth, such mergers eliminate inde-
pendent sources of potential competition, firms whose resources would enable them
to enter concentrated industries without merger. Fifth, such mergers enlarge the
opportunities of the merged firms to use against their less diversified rivals such
restrictive devices as business reciprocity, tie-in sales and subsidization.
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(2) cross-subsidization, (3) non-price competition, (4) the raising of entry
barriers, and (5) reciprocity.
It is well-known that "creeping conglomeration" has reduced the use-
fulness of the public financial statements of these firms. The consolidation
of sales, profits, costs, etc. makes it impossible to get an accurate idea as to
a conglomerate's doings in its various markets. While Weston only discusses
this (lamentable) situation, the Staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price
Stability also presents an imaginative and practical program for ameliora-
tion.32 The reader is urged to peruse their recommendations.
The problem of cross-subsidization is implemented by the aforemen-
tioned practice of inadequate financial reporting. Weston claims it also
encourages predatory pricing. Our foregoing critical comments on the like-
lihood of such a practice apply here.
The problems of non-price competition and entry barriers can be con-
sidered together. Weston claims the "deep-pocket" theory, which states that
large firms bear ephemeral losses better than smaller concerns, is one reason
non-price competition is important. Thus, it is claimed that large concerns
can resort to frequent style and model changes and heavy advertising by
digging into their "deep-pocket" resources. In short, Weston claims that
cross-subsidization, non-price competition and other factors create substan-
tial entry barriers for small firms. I would have several reservations regard-
ing Weston's comments on the "deep-pocket" theory. First of all, it is not
yet unequivocally established that large firms have the scale advantages in
distribution that many people think. Peterman's careful reconsideration of
the Clorox case is evidence that this is still an open question. Secondly, and
more importantly, I think Weston is guilty of the rather common error in
economics of using a sloppy and sometimes inconsistent definition of "bar-
riers to entry." Stigler defines a barrier to entry as "a cost of producing (at
some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks
to enter an industry, but is not borne by firms already in the industry."33
This concept should properly be distinguished from economies of scale (or
plant) and its (internal) costs of production. Thus, entry can be free into
an industry, i.e., involve no entry barriers, even if capital requirements are
high. For example, it does require considerable sums of money to enter the
automobile or aluminum industry, but this is not proof of a barrier to entry
unless the cost of acquiring such funds differs for existing and potential
firms in the industry. Similarly, product differentiation is a barrier to entry
only if the costs of differentiation are different for potential firms than they
are for exiting firms. Proof that a given industry involves considerable ex-
penditures on advertising is not the same thing as demonstrating there are
barriers to entry into the industry. There may be barriers but the final ver-
dict would require additional information, viz., as to relative advertising costs
32 STUDY PAPER No. 2, at 86-88.
33 STiGLER at 67.
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for potential versus existing firms. In short, economies of scale and barriers
to entry are not the same thing. Thirdly, I think Weston also makes the
common error in economics of a priori assuming non-price competition is
less efficient than price competition. Yet, as Stigler has demonstrated, in the
end this turns out to rest upon an empirical judgment.8 4 That is, for price
competition to be more efficient than non-price competition marginal pro-
duction costs must rise less rapidly than marginal nonproduction costs where
the latter includes outlays on advertising, product differentiation, and other
non-price variables. While this is certainly a plausible assumption, it is
worth reiterating that it is required for the hypothesis to hold.
Finally, Weston claims that conglomeration lends itself to reciprocity
by increasing the potentials and opportunities of such arrangements. Un-
fortunately, he provides the reader with no rigorous demonstration as to
why this would necessarily be the case. While it would be easy to intuit
along these lines, this is a poor substitute for systematic economic logic.
Clearly, more work is required along these lines.3r
Unlikely Consequences of Conglomerate Mergers
Some people have expressed some fears with regard to "creeping con-
glomeration" that seem extremely remote. Two of these presumed conse-
quences stem from the belief that conglomeration is likely to lead to greater
monopoly power. We have already suggested that this has not been true
in American society. That is, the current merger movement has had very
little direct impact on the degree of market concentration. But let us grant
for the moment that the assumption is correct and examine the two pro-
posals.
One idea is that conglomeration will lead to greater managerial in-
efficiency - where inefficiency means more pecuniary (nonpecuniary) income
could be earned with no loss in nonpecuniary (pecuniary) income - as mo-
nopolists are more inefficient than competitors.3 6 The crux of the argument
is that mismanaged competitive firms face insolvency, whereas mismanaged
monopolist firms only face reductions in the profit level. However, this con-
clusion does not accord with standard economic theory. If input markets
are competitive, management is as likely to be just as alert and aggressive
in monopoly as in competition. Alchian and Kessel argue that "competi-
tion in the capital markets will allocate monopoly rights to those who can
use them most profitably. Therefore, so long as free capital markets are
available, the absence of competition in product markets does not imply
34 STIGLER ch. 3.
35 I think the most sophisticated analysis that has been done heretofore is the excel-
lent paper by Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAw & CONTEMP. Paoo. 552 (1965).
36 It should be noted that some writers make the opposite claim. For instance, John
H. Rubel, Vice President, Litton Industries, Inc., in Weston & Peltzman, at 208-18, suggests
that conglomerates are likely to result in greater efficacy sinCe they are more likely to apply
a systems approach to corporate problems.
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a different quality of management in monopolistic as compared with com-
petitive enterprises. ' 8 7
The second idea that is sometimes advanced is that monopoly and
hence conglomeration has special relevance to inflation. Again, orthodox
economic theory does not support this assertion. The monopolist is not
interested in raising prices per se but only in obtaining the profit-maximiz-
ing price. Usually, however, the argument is presented in a slightly more
sophisticated form than this. It runs as follows: as the American economy
becomes more concentrated as a result of conglomeration, there will be an
inflation of prices relative to competitive conditions (given the money stock).
First of all, the evidence is at best ambiguous with regard to whether con-
centration has been increasing.3 8 Secondly, the evidence is definitely contrary
regarding the alleged association between concentration of production and
the amplitude of price changes.3 9 Thus the association of monopoly power
(and hence conglomeration according to the proposed thesis) and inflation
lacks both a theoretical rationale and an empirical basis.
Parenthetically, I might add here that Jesse W. Markham, in his state-
ment at the Economic Concentration hearings, expressed much the same
skepticism as I have regarding such things as the efficiency of monopolist
managers and the nexus between conglomeration and monopoly power. For
instance, he commented that "conglomerateness and nothing more raises no
public policy issue; the term is simply a synonym for industrial diversifica-
tion and bestows on the business entity to which it is frequently applied
no more nor no less special significance than that of a group of independent
firms competing in the same markets. '40
CONCLUSIONS
It would be nice if I could end this paper by proposing some imag-
inative method of dealing with "creeping conglomeration." However, the
relative newness of the phenomenon has meant that neither economic theory
nor public policy has been able to provide the means for effectively dealing
with it. Unfortunately, I do not have any such public proposal to offer.
37 Aichian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in
AsPEcTs oF LABOR ECONOMICS 156 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research ed. 1962). Naturally, this
statement must be qualified in the case of nontransferable assets, e.g., human monopoly
rights and powers such as those commanded by Raquel Welch.
88 Study Paper No. 2 definitely argues that there has been no upward trend in con-
centration. See also Kamerschen, An Empirical Test of Oligopoly Theories, 76 J. PoL.
EcoN. 615-34 (1968); Kamerschen, Market Growth and Industry Concentration, 63 J. AM.
STAT. Ass'N 228-41 (1968); Kamerschen, The Determination of Profit Rates in Oligopolistic
Industries, 42 J. Bus. 293-301 (1969).
89 See, e.g., Selden & de Podwin, Business Pricing Policies and Inflation, 71 J. POL.
EcoN. 116-27 (1963), who found no relationship between concentration and price move-
ments in the United States economy in the 1950's.
40 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1269-71 (1965) (remarks of
Jesse W. Markham). A similar view, held by Stigler, was already discussed at note 2 supra
and accompanying text.
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It does seem apparent that the old standbys- the Sherman and Clayton
Acts -are not well suited for this task.
I do think Professor Walter Adams' idea for handling the task is worthy
of further consideration. He suggests that we
explore the feasibility of adapting the Public Utility Holding Company
Act provisions to conglomerate bigness in manufacturing. Such a statute
should emphasize corporate reorganizations which would not only lessen
unwarranted concentrations of economic power, but which would also
enhance corporate efficiency. It should be a constructive, not punitive,
statute -a selective instrument, not a general "death sentence." It should
automatically exempt companies with assets of less, say, than $100 million;
and place as much reliance as possible on voluntary compliance. But, most
important, the new law should make a start in curbing this less defensible
form of private socialism in America.41
To repeatt it would be desirable to close on a positive note, contain-
ing some novel proposal. Unfortunately, I have none. Instead, I shall only
repeat, inasmuch as I concur with much of it, Willard F. Mueller's (Direc-
tor, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission) conclusion regard-
ing the present state of our knowledge of conglomerates:
[I]t is easier to pose problems with respect to the conglomerate enterprise,
than it is to chart effective public policy designed to cope with these
problems. Certainly no one would argue seriously that it is either feasible
or desirable to dismantle all existing positions of conglomerate power,
either in food retailing or elsewhere in the economy. Nor are existing
antitrust laws designed to cope with anticompetitive conduct entirely
adequate to deal with problems of the misuse of conglomerate power.42
41 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 251 (remarks of Walter Adams). You will recall
that the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was addressed to the phenomenon of
corporate bigness in a single industry in that it
sought to impose a flexible limitation on the size of utility holding systems by
eliminating certain types of corporate structures which had tended to promote
the growth of huge sprawling systems without regard to the integration of prop-
erties or to economles of operation. It sought to eliminate situations, for example,
where an electric company in Oregon, a gas company in Pennsylvania, and a water
company in Texas would be jointly controlled by a financial promoter with head-
quarters in New York City. It sought to deal with a concentration of power over
functionally unrelated operations - a conglomerate concentration of power which
could not be justified on grounds of superior efficiency or technological progres-
siveness.
Id. at 250. Adams' full testimony is on pages 248-62. See also Adams' draft of some years
ago on a proposed holding company act which is included as Appendix 5, at 353-78.
42 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, Appendix I, at 2012 (1966)
(testimony of Dr. Willard Mueller). Perhaps the best example of the present state of futil-
ity in conglomerate economics is revealed by an October 24, 1969 article in the Wall Street
Journal by Louis M. gohlmeier. He reports that the 700-page Federal Trade Commission's
study of conglomerate mergers is being called "old hat" even though it wasn't slated to be
released for another two weeks. The report and recommendations -including the strong
proposal to bar all acquisitions by large companies of leading firms in "other industries" -
is to be issued as a staff document with no endorsement or comment by the commis-
sioners. The article reports that some commissioners say that the "staff study is based on
old statistics and litigated antitrust cases and that it doesn't attempt to resolve economic
questions concerning novel effects of conglomerate mergers on competition or the effects
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In short, I find myself in more agreement with the moderate group
that argues that each conglomerate case must be judged on its own merits,
than with either the extreme group that feels that conglomerate mergers
are inherently anticompetitive, or the extreme group that suggests that con-
glomerate mergers have no impact on competition.
on the pricing and quality of products." The article also reports that Commissioner Philip
Elman, in a speech before the American Bar Association, is already calling for a new in-
vestigation of the economic consequences of mergers and concentration including examin.
ing "existing concentration" in established corporations, as well as new conglomerate
mergers. He suggested, for instance, that companies such as duPont, General Foods, and
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing should be included in any such study because, he
said, they are widely diversified concerns. Their diversification resulted from acquisitions
made many years ago. He also stated that "even though the Nixon Administration
is pressing the application of existing antitrust laws and conglomerate mergers, very little
is known about the economic consequences of conglomerates. He noted that businessmen
and professional economists as well as antitrust lawyers disagree sharply on whether con-
glomerate mergers have any long- or short-term effects on competition." Wall Street
Journal (Midwest ed.), Oct. 24, 1969, at 8, col. 3.
The actual FTC study itself was reported on in the November 5, 1969 issue of the
Wall Street Journal by Mr. Kohlmeier, as not presenting any startingly new data. He did
report that the study showed
merger activity during January-September 1969 was nearly 6 percent greater than
in the 1968 period, despite a decline in consolidations in the second and third
quarters. It added that the country's 200 largest companies at the end of 1968
controlled about 60 percent of the total manufacturing assets. In 1941, it said,
the 1,000 largest controlled that proportion.
Three aspects of the merger trend that were brought out in the study are worth repeating:
[I] It said that contrary to some notions, the great majority of conglomerate
mergers aren't between companies in totally dissimilar businesses, but involve
companies in related though not directly competitive lines. Acquisitions by petro-
leum companies of chemical and coal concerns were cited as an example. [2] The
study also found that the nation's largest acquisition-minded companies have
bought the most profitable concerns and smaller companies generally have ac-
quired less profitable concerns. It asserted that almost all mergers have been
motivated by "a variety of tax, financial and personal advantages" rather than by
"the requirements of large-scale production, research or innovation." [3] It also
produced evidence that conglomerate companies have greater "opportunity and
incentive" to deal in reciprocity- which involves purchasing supplies from com-
panies that are customers.
Wall Street Journal (Midwest ed.), Nov. 5, 1969, at 36, col. 1.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
1ju AcquisynoNs MADE uy FWmms CLAssivixu AMONG ntn 200 Lacrs, 1948-1967
Total large acquisitionsl
Assets
Year Number (millions)
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
Total
1968 estimate
4
5
4
9
13
23
55
68
58
50
38
64
62
59
72
68
91
93
101
170
1,087
188
$66
67
173
201
327
679
1,425
2,129
2,037
1,472
1,107
1,960
1,710
2,129
2,194
2,917
2,798
3,900
4,100
8,246
39,584
12,366
Total acquired by
200 largest firms2
Assets
Number (millions)
4 $66
5 67
2 107
5 125
6 187
17 561
11 96
33 1,412
37 1,527
29 1,104
24 707
36 1,425
33 978
25 1,240
31 1,095
34 1,843
37 1,221
29 2,061
31 2,215
66 5,392
501 24,239
703 6,7553
1 Acquired units with assets of $10 million or more.
2 For years 1948-1965, 200 largest firms ranked by 1965 assets; for 1966 and 1967, ac-
quirers are 200 largest firms ranked by 1966 assets, excluding those firms acquired in
1967.
3 Estimate of the 1968 acquisitions by the 200 largest companies of 1967.
SoURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
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TABLE II
NUMBER OF ACQUISITIONS AND MANUFACTURING ASSETs ACQUIRED DURING 1948-1967
COMPARED WITH TOTAL MANUFACTURING, 1967
A. NUMBER
Companies
acquired
Acquisitions
Total as percent
companies of total
Size class of acquired firm (millions) 1948-19671 19672 19672
$10 to $25 593 1,138 52
$25 to $50 227 517 44
$50 to $100 114 297 38
$100 to $250 53 252 21
Over $250 11 249 4
Total 998 2,453 41
B. ASSETS
Total assets Total manu-
acquired facturing assets Acquired as
1948-19671 19672 (in percent of
Size class of acquired firm (millions) (in billions) millions) total
$10 to $25 $9 $18 50
$25 to $50 8 18 42
$50 to $100 8 21 36
$100 to $250 7 39 19
Over $250 4 248 2
Total 36 344 11
1 All mining acquisitions have been excluded from these data.
2 1st quarter.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
TABLE III
DIsTRIBuTIoN OF LARGE MANUFACTURING AND MINING AcQUISITIONS BY
SIZE OF ACQUIRING COMPANY, 1948-1967
[Dollar amounts in millions]
Value of
Size class of acquiring Number of Percent of acquired Percent of
company' acquisitions total assets total
Unknown 26 2.4 $540 1.4
$10 to $252 109 10.2 2,044 5.2
$25 to $50 132 12.4 3,310 8.4
$50 to $100 171 16.0 4,798 12.2
$100 to $250 273 25.6 9,358 23.9
$250 and over 356 33.4 19,183 43.9
Total 1,067 100.0 39,233 100.0
1 Size at time of acquisition.
2 19 of these acquisitions were made by companies with assets of less than $10 mil-
lion at the time of acquisition.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
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TABLE IV
THESE FIRMS WOULD COLLIDE WITH NEW MERGER GumES
While Attorney General Mitchell did not specify which companies would be subject
to strict merger controls, here is a list of the 200 largest industrial corporations, as
ranked by 1968 assets by Fortune magazine.
Standard Oil (NJ.)
General Motors
Ford
Texaco
Gulf Oil
Mobil Oil
IBM
U.S. Steel
General Telephone
Standard Oil-California
General Electric
Standard Oil (Indiana)
Chrysler
Shell Oil
International Tel.
Tenneco
Du Pont
Union Carbide
Bethlehem Steel
Phillips Petroleum
Western Electric
Ling-Temco-Vouglt
Eastman Kodak
Continental Oil
Atlantic Richfield
Goodyear Tire
RCA
Sun Oil
Dow Chemical
Union Oil-California
Westinghouse
Alcoa
Boeing
Gulf & Western
International Harvester
Monsanto
Firestone Tire
Cities Service
Sinclair Oil
Avco
Occidental Petroleum
Getty Oil
International Paper
Anaconda
W. R. Grace
Reynolds Metals
Celanese
Armco Steel
Procter & Gamble
Republic Steel
Kennecott Copper
American Tobacco
Caterpillar Tractor
Allied Chemical
Singer
Deere
Kaiser Aluminum
N. American Rockwell
National Steel
United Aircraft
American Can
McDonnell Douglas
Northwest Industries
Georgia Pacific
Glen Alden
Signal Cos.
Litton Industries
Reynolds Tobacco
Burlington Industries
Inland Steel
Minnesota Mining
Owens-Illinois
Marathon Oil
U.S. Plywood-Champion
Uniroyal
National Cash Register
Sperry Rand
PPG Industries
Continental Can
Weyerhaeuser
General Foods
B. F. Goodrich
Boise Cascade
Youngstown Sheet
Borden
Olin Mathieson
Honeywell
American Cyanamid
FMC
American Standard
Kraftco
International Utilities
Crown Zellerbach
Lockheed
Xerox
Bendix
St. Regis Paper
Textron
TRW
CPC International
General Dynamics
Control Data
General Tire
Coca-Cola
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Hercules
National Distillers
Kimberly-Clark
Philip Morris
American Metal Climax
Borg-Warner
Standard Oil (Ohio)
Burroughs
American Smelting
Scott Paper
Ashland Oil
Pfizer
Swift
Seagram
Norton Simon
Mead
Allis-Chalmers
American Home
Gen. Amer. Trans.
Phelps Dodge
J. P. Stevens
Martin Marietta
Diamond Shamrock
Kerr-McGee
United Merchants
Ralston Purina
Kaiser Industries
Eaton Yale & Towne
White Consolidated
Ingersoll-Rand
National Lead
Teledyne
International Minerals
Studebaker-Worthington
Wheeling-Pitts Steel
Colt Industries
Ogden
Kaiser Steel
Consolidated Foods
Armour
Campbell Soup
Ethyl
Dresser
Standard Brands
GAF
U.S. Gypsum
Dart Industries
Heinz
TABLE IV (Continued)
153. Colgate-Palmolive
154. Cerro
155. Anheuser-Busch
156. Warner-Lambert
157. Bristol-Myers
158. Texas Gulf Sulphur
159. Babcock & Wilcox
160. Time Inc.
161. Liggett & Myers
162. General Mills
163. Combustion Engineering
164. Air Reduction
165. Motorola
166. Hess Oil
167. Merck
168. Fruehauf
169. Del Monte
170. White Motor
171. Union Camp
172. Johns-Manville
173. PepsiCo
174. National Biscuit
175. Amerada Petroleum
176. SCM
177. Squibb Beech-Nut
178. Raytheon
179. Corning Glass
180. American Machine
181. Eli Lilly
182. Carnation
183. Union Tank Car
184. Genesco
185. Armstrong Cork
186. Texas Instruments
187. Stauffer Chemical
188. Johnson & Johnson
189. West Virginia Pulp
190. Pullman
191. Whirlpool
192. Brunswick
193. Jim Walter
194. Coastal States Gas
195. Gillette
196. U.S. Industries
197. Northrop
198. Revere Copper
199. National Gypsum
200. Rohm &c Haas
A number of other companies are not classified by Fortune as "industrial corpora-
tions," but had assets in 1968 at least equal to $391,937,000, the assets of Rohm & Haas, the
200th largest on the industrial list. Among these other companies are:
1. Columbia Broadcasting
2. Ebasco
3. Foremost-McKesson
4. Engelhard Minerals
5. Halliburton
6. United Fruit
7. Amer. Broadcasting
8. Sperry & Hutchinson
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TABLE IV (Continued)
Stricter merger regulation also may be applied to large concerns outside the indus-
trial field. Here are the 10 largest retailing companies, ranked by Fortune by 1968 sales.
1. Sears 6. Marcor
2. A&P 7. Woolworth
3. Safeway 8. Federated Stores
4. Penney 9. Kresge
5. Kroger 10. Food Fair
Here are the 10 largest transportation companies, ranked by Fortune by 1968 operat-
ing revenue.
1. Penn Central 6. TWA
2. United Air Lines 7. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry
3. Southern Pacific 8. Norfolk & Western Ry
4. Pan American Airways 9. Santa Fe Industries
5. American Airlines 10. Eastern Air Lines
Here are the 10 largest utilities, ranked by Fortune by 1968 assets.
1. AT&T 6. Southern Co.
2. Consolidated Edison 7. American Electric Pwr.
3. Pacific Gas 8. Public Service Electric
4. S. Calif. Edison 9. El Paso Natural Gas
5. Commonwealth Edison 10. Columbia Gas System
SouRCE: Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1969, at 14, col. 12.
